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FLORIDA'S CHARITABLE "MORTMAIN"* ACT
G. STANLEY JOSLIN**

Florida in 1933 turned to a legislative restriction on testamentary gifts
to charities for the first time. Believing that unrestricted "death bed" charitable devises and bequests often resulted inunjust treatment of the heirs
or spouse of the testator, the legislature provided that devises or bequests to
charitable or religious institutions or purposes stall be invalid unless executed at least six months prior to the death of the testator, if the testator
dies leaving certain heirs or a spouse surviving.' The intent is obvious; ' but
the advisability of such legislative restriction on the testamentary power is
contested by many.8 It does not seem that such a restriction during a reasonable time before death, to protect natural objects of the testator's bounty, is
improper; but rather, it is a just and needed shield to ward off certain
influences which may be concentrated during this "death's-door" period. 4
I-TISTORICAL NOTE

Although Florida is the only state to make an initial enactment of this
testamentary restriction in the 20th Century (to date), many other jurisdictions have had similar laws for many years. New York has had such a gen* The name of "Mortmain Acts" was given these legislative enactments from a
very early date, The Mortmain Act, 1736, 9 GEO. II, c,36, is sometimes called the
parent mortmain act. It provided that all gifts and conveyances for charitable uses
must be by deed executed before two witnesses, delivered twelve months before death,
and enrolled within six months after its execution. At the time when mortmain as a
term became associated with these religious and charitable associations, other types
of associations were almost nonexistent. Later, as business corporations were formed,
the term mortmain became associated with them also. Here we are considering mortmain in it original association with charitable and religious institutions. See Taylor v.
Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 364, 17 So.2d 615, 618 (1944). "Our statute is not a mortmain act."
** Associate Professor of Law, Emory University.
1. FLA. STAT. § 731.19 (1951). "If a testator dies leaving issue of his body or
an adopted child, or the lineal descendants of either, or a spouse, and if the will of
such testator devises or bequeaths the estate of such testator, or any part thereof, to a
benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious or missionary institution, corporation,
association or purpose, or to this state, or to any other state or country, or to a county,
city or town in this or any other state or country, or to a person in trust for any such
purpose or beneficiary, whether or not such trust appears on the face of the instnment making such devise or bequest, such will as to such devise or bequest shall be
invalid unless it was duly executed at least six months prior to the death of the
testator." The Act is constitutional. Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 364, 17 So.2d
615, 618 (1944).
2. Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 364, 17 So.2d 615, 618 (1944).
"It is to
protect the widow and children from improvident gifts made to their neglect by the
testator the design . . . being obviously to prevent testators who may be laboring under
the apprehension of impending death from disposing of their estates to the exclusion
of those who are, or should be, the natural objects of the testator's bounty."
3. Id. at 364, 17 So.2d at 618, ("Whether the legislative philosophy behind
such enactment is sound may be debatable").
4. Joslin, Legal Restrictions On Gifts To Charities. 21 'rl'.NN. L. REV. 761 (1951).
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eral restrictive act since 1848, Pennsylvania since 1855, Mississippi since
1857, California since 1874; and Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Montana,
Ohio and the District of Columbia all have had such restrictive legislation
for over sixty years. These acts have been amended frequently, indicating
that the legislators have reviewed the problem and reaffirmed the need for
this legislation restricting dispositions to charities. The litigation under
these acts has been voluminous, especially in New York and California,
and so it can be assumed that their survival is not a matter of default or
oversight. A careful analysis of the reasons for this restriction would seem
to give credence to a view that jurisdictions without it have not given the
matter careful consideration. England and the Canadian Provinces of
Ontario, Saskatchewan and Manitoba also have restrictive statutes.5 Although the acts of these various jurisdictions have many variations and
have shifted emphases during their long history, the basic thesis has persisted-the restricting and controlling, to some extent, of the right and
power of disposition to religious and charitable institutions or purposes.0
Most of the jurisdictions enacting a restriction on the dispositive process,
when religious or charitable uses were the beneficiaries, have retained and
strengthened their scope; yet, some have adopted such legislation and
repealed it later, leaving no restriction in this area. This phase of the
history of such legislation gives little evidence of a careful consideration
of its merit when abandoned but does in some instances show traces of
strong lobbies or cataclysmic social and political changes during which
7
whole areas of legislation were lost in the turmoil of the new eras.
A collation of these acts shows that, in England and Canada, the
emphasis of the restriction is on inter vivos gifts made a short time before
death, while in the United States the testamentary restriction is emphasized unanimously.8 Florida, then, followed this pattern by its testamentary restriction. The time before death designated as the restricted
period usually varies from thirty days to one year, with the thirty day
5. IIALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENo., f 190; REv. STAT. OF ONT. c. 241, § 6; REV.
SASK. C. 120, § 8; STAT. OF MAN. c. 48, p. 122.
6. Joslin, Mortmain in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Study,
29 CAN. B. REV. 621 (1950). There seems to have been a definite shift from a
design to prevent charitable and religious institutions from amassing tremendous estates
in perpetuity, to one of protection of the testator's family. Is it possible that charitable
STAT. OF

foundations in this country may some day amass such vast areas of land and wealth

as to again cause a shift of emphasis? England found herself in this situation at one
time. See Attorney General v. Day, 1 Ves. Sr. 218, 223 (1748).
7. Michigan adopted a restrictive act in 1855 and repealed it in 1867. Laws of
Mich. 1853-5, Act No. 145, §§ 24, 26; Wisconsin's restrictive provision of 1891 was
repealed in 1893. Wis. Laws 1891, c. 359, p. 464; Missouri, from 1865 to 1879,
Mo. CONST. Art. I, § 13 (1865); Delaware in 1787, Del. Laws, 1700-97, Vol. II
3,
p. 800; Massachusetts before it became a state but not after. Prov. Laws 1754, § 3,
p. 779.
8. See note 5 supra; CAL. PRon. ConE § 41 (1949); D. C. CODE ANN. § 19-202
(1951); FLA. STAT. § 731.19 (1951); GA. Cone ANm. § 113-107 (Supp. 1951); IDAnHo
CODE ANN. § 14-325 (1947); IowA COVE, § 1848 (1950); Miss. CODE Am. § 671
t1942); MONT. Rv. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947); N. Y. DEc. EST. LAW § 17;
UOIo CODE ANN. § 10504-5 (1938); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7 (Supp. 1952).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
restriction most prevalent.
by comparison.9

Florida's six month restriction is not unusual

PROBLEMS ARISING UNDER THE FLORIDA TYPE Acr.
Although very few problems under the Florida Act have been contested in the Florida Supreme Court, litigation inother states on similar
statutes has been considerable. It is probable, then, that as time goes
on, more problems will be raised in Florida and this area of precedent will
be of great help in resolving them. It is obvious that the effect of the
testamentary restriction may be avoided by an inter vivos gift a short
time before death. Thus, one who is expected to die within the restricted
period may be prevailed upon to make a present instead of a testamentary
gift. The statute does not cover this situation and such a procedure is
given the sanction of the courts.' 0 Whether the scope of the restriction
should be extended to this inter vivos area is a matter for the legislator,
and not our concern here.
EVASION OF THE STATUTE BY THE "MORAL

TRUST"

The effectiveness of the time restriction on testamentary gifts to
religious and charitable institutions has been circumvented shamefully
by the device illustrated in the case of Schultz's Appeal." The testator,
while very ill, sent for a scrivener and directed him to draw a will devising
his estate to certain institutions. The scrivener informed him that in all
probability he would not live the statutory period required for such devises
and that it would be ineffective. However, he counselled that a devise
could be made to an individual whom the testator was satisfied would
carry out his wishes after death, and that he (the scrivener) would inform
him of those wishes. The will was executed as suggested. The testator
died seven days later. The court held the device was not an improper
evasion of the statute and the devise was effective even though the individual agreed that he would apply the property to the institution as the
testator had wished. The court stated, "If the statute is practically
repealed by this construction it is evident that it must be for the legislature ...
Similar evasive problems have been litigated in several
jurisdictions with similar results and such represents the present weight of
judicial opinion.' 3 It seems, however, that a court of today would rightly
be less concerned with the technicalities and view the whole process, hold14
ing it to be within the statutory proscription and therefore ineffective.
*"12

9. See state citations, ibid.
10. See President of Bowdoin College v. Merritt, 75 Fed. 480 (N. D. Cal. 1896);
Schultz's Appeal, 80 Pa. 396 (1876).
11. 80 Pa. 396 (1876).
12. Id. at 407. The author has taken slight liberty in citing the facts to keep
from introducing an element not necessary here.
13. Buckley's Estate, 270 Pa. 101, 113 Atl. 68 (1921); Purcell Estate, 167 Cal.
176, 138 Pac. 704 (1914); Flood v.Ryan, 220 Pa. 450, 69 Atl. 908 (1908).
14. "The decisions are wrong in principle, in that they make valid admitted
attempts to evade the public policy . . . expressed inher statutes . . . ." Buckley's
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The key to this type of evasive stratagem is the absolute gift to the
individual with only a moral obligation on his part to carry out the testator's wishes. Any devise or bequest to an individual with a mutual
understanding, express or implied, that the property will be given to
religious or charitable institutions, creates a trust in equity which is voidable tinder the statute; and parol testimony is admissible to show that
such devises or bequests, absolute on their face, are in fact in trust."- The
Florida statute emphasizes this matter by providing, "If a testator . . .
devises or bequeaths . . . to a person in trust for any such purpose or

beneficiary, whether such trust appears on the face of the instrument
making such devise or bequest or not . . . .. "16
This provision of the
Florida law seems to indicate a strong legislative disapproval of these
evasive devices and may logically be a statutory basis for refusing to give
merit to the "moral trust" theory of the earlier cases.
EvAsIoN BY OBVIATING THE

INCENTIVE TO RAISE THE

PROTECTION OF THE STATUTE

The Florida Act provides that certain devises or bequests "shall be
invalid" if the testator dies "leaving issue of his body, or an adopted child,

or the lineal descendants of either, or a spouse."' 7 It is well established
that the "shall be invalid" provision makes such restricted devises or
bequests voidable but not void.' 8 The protection is extended only to
a certain named class, and only those in that class may assert it. If these
testamentary provisions are not avoided by affirmative action on the
part of members of the designated class, they are effective. The religious
or charitable object will take although it could have been prevented from
taking had members of the class elected to avoid these provisions.19 Basically then, the statute permits any testamentary gifts to religious or charitable objects if members of the protected class do not object. To evade
the restrictive effect of the statute, the testator has in many cases attempted
to take away the reason for raising an objection to the charitable devise.
This usually resolves itself into some device which, if given its express
effect, would result in no benefit to the members of the class even if
they did assert the statutory restriction. 0
Suppose, for example, that a father is near death and, at this time,
Estate, 270 Pa. 101, 104; 113 Ati. 68, 69 (1921), see also id. at 70. See Flood v.
Ryan, 220 Pa. 450, 460; 69 Ati. 908, 911 (1908) (dissenting opinion).
15. Leopold Schmucker's Estate, 61 Mo. 592 (1876); Kenricks v. Cole, 61 Mo.
572 (1876). Clippenger's Estate, 75 Cal. App.2d 426, 171 P.2d 567 (1946).
See
Flood v. Ryan, 220 Pa. 450, 69 Atl. 908 (1908); Schultz's Appeal, 80 Pa. 396, 405
(1876).
16. FLA. STAT. § 731.19 (1951).
17. Ibid.
18. Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So.2d 615 (1944); Monahan v. O'Byrne,
147 Ga. 633, 95 S.E. 210 (1918); Karolusson v. Poonessa, 207 Iowa 127, 222 N.W.
431 (1929).
19. Bunn Estate, 33 Cal.2d 897, 206 P.2d 635 (1949); Taylor v. Payne, 154
Fla. 359, 17 So.2d 615 (1944).
20. E.g., Davis Estate, 74 Cal. App.2d 357, 168 P.2d 789 (1946); Layton Estate,
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is inclined to be a charitable benefactor rather than provide for his son.
(The merit of the Act is not in issue here.) Upon being advised that in
all probability he will not live the six months as provided by the Florida
Act, and that his son may elect to avoid any charitable devise or bequest,
he may be led to provide in his will that if his son avoids the charitable
bequest such avoided portion shall then go to some person or object not
in the protected class. Should the father die within six months, there
would be no incentive for his son to avoid the disposition to charity as
lie would receive no benefit from such avoidance. This would allow the
charity to take as the scheme intended. A more vicious scheme may be
the use of the in terrorern provision by which the son could get none of
the avoided charitable disposition and would forfeit all devises and
bequests to him because of raising the statutory protection. These schemes
have been frequently used in other jurisdictions and too frequently per1
mitted, thus defeating the restrictive effect of the statute.2
It seems that such circumvention should not be permitted. Although
a testator may disinherit his children if he desires, he should not be permitted to disinherit them by an evasive scheme so that charities may take.
To permit this is to permit the evils which the statute is intended to
remedy, viz., a direct conflict between the influence asserted by religious
and charitable objects, as against the obligation and concern for those
under the natural bounty of the testator. In this conflict during the last
few months of life, the concern for the children is too often overcome by
charitable impulses.
The Florida Act provides that devises and bequests to religious
or charitable objects are voidable unless duly executed at least six months
prior to death of the testator. 2 2 If the testator attempts to provide in his
will for schemes whereby he removes all reason for raising the protection
of the statute, the whole scheme is actually to make a bequest or devise
to charity. This logical interpretation should result in the direct charitable disposition and its indirect disinheriting clause being avoided. As
a result, those whom the statute was meant to protect would have an
incentive and interest in asserting their statutory right. The California
court has held, under its restrictive statute, that a provision in the will,
"In the event that for any reason set forth in Section 41, 42 and 43 of the
Probate Code 23 . . . my executors or executor are unable to distribute
any portion of my estate upon my death .. .Idirect that in such event said
portion of my estate shall be distributed, and I give, devise and bequeath
217 Cal. 451, 19 P.2d 793 (1933); Thomas v. Ohio State University, 70 Ohio St. 92,
70 N.E. 896 (1904); Trustees of Ohio State University v. Folsom, 56 Ohio St. 701,
47 N.E. 581 (1895).
21. See note 19 sura. See Kirkbride v. Hickok, 64 Ohio St. 473, 98 N.E.2d 815
(1951) for a good result but questionable reasoning.
2 FRak. S'rAT. t 731.19 (1951).
23. CAL. P o. CODE § 41, 42, 43 (1949), restricts religious and charitable devises
and bequests if made within thirty days of death.
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the same, to . . ." persons not in the class protected by the statute, will
be given effect.24 Here is the clearest example of evasion where the
testator states in his will that if his children avoid the charitable devise
or bequest the avoided portion shall not go to them. Could there be a
more apparent or more flagrant effacement of the legislators' intent? The
Florida Court, when presented with this problem, will in all probability
25
take a more courageous stand.
PROBLEMS

RAISED BY CODICILS OR RE-EXECUTION

OF WILLS

Under the Florida-type statute restricting the period of time before
death when effective testamentary gifts to charities must be made, a
problem arises when a will devising or bequeathing to charities is executed
before the restricted period, but a new will executed within the restricted
time makes substantially the same gifts to the identical charities. Suppose
for example, a Florida testator had executed his will five years before,
giving Blackacre to X Charity and the balance of his estate to his children,
A and B. Then within six months of death, he executed a new will giving
Blackacre to X Charity and the balance of his estate to A. The only change
by the new will is to disinherit B. It is clear that the later will would be
voidable in its charitable disposition if the charities named were different
institutions or objects. But if the second will makes a lesser or an identical
gift to the same charitable objects, it does not seem that permitting the
charity to take would be contrary to the purport of the statute, as the
intent of the testator is evidenced by an execution at a time deemed proper
under the statute. The charitable gifts in both wills should be considered
separately from the other provisions and it seems, by a doctrine of
"dependent relative revocation" or intent of the testator, the revocation
should not apply to the first will's charitable disposition and it should
be effective under the statute. However, it has been held that a codicil,
executed within the restricted period and having a declaration of revocation, does not by the doctrine of "dependent relative revocation" reinstate
bequests made to charities in a former codicil executed before the restricted
period.26 Further, it has been held, where a legacy for a charitable use is
void because the will was executed within the restricted time, the fact that
such legacy is identical with a prior will made before such period does not
24. Davis Estate, 74 Cal. App. 357, 168 P.2d 789 (1946).
25. Although the procedures used to restrain the class from invoking their rights

tinder the statute are usually contained in the will itself, the testator may, during his
life, attempt to make arrangements with members of the class so that they will not
or cannot invoke the statute. A written promise by members of the class that they
will apply property that comes to them because of the avoidance of a charitable gift,
to certain charities, is a trust unenforceable under the statute. Watson Estate, 177
Misc. 308, 30 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sur. Ct. 1941). The right to assert the statutory
restriction may be waived after testator's death. Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17
So.2d 615 (1944).
But agreements not to assert the statute, made before death of
the testator, are not waivers of the right, nor does it estop those of the class from
raising it. Watson Estate, supra.
26. Ely v. Megie, 219 N. Y. 112, 113 N.E. 800 (1916).
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make that part of the former will effective. The Act does not permit the
court to seek a former will. 2'
A different result is reached when a codicil, executed within the
restricted period, to a will executed in proper time, makes the same provision for charities that was made by the will. Although the codicil revokes
all prior wills, the bequest to charity stands as made and executed at the
date of the will, and the charitable gift is not voidable. This results
notwithstanding a statute providing that the execution of a codicil has
the effect of republishing the will as modified. 28
A gift to a religious or charitable use, created by a will executed in
proper time, will not be defeated by a later codicil which simply diminishes
the amount of the gift, although the later instrument is executed within
the restricted period. The operative effect of the gift is the date of the
will, but the amount of the gift is determined by the codicil. 20 A codicil
executed within the restricted period increasing bequests to persons, which
thereby decreased a residuary gift to charities provided by a will executed
in proper time, was held to leave such gift effective as decreased. 30 The
second will, if in fact a will, may not be called a codicil so that the gifts
to charities relate back to the earlier will." But a will may be so called
when in legal effect it is a codicil.3 2 Under the Act restricting the time for
execution of testamentary gifts to charities, the codicil does not make the
will speak from the date of the codicil, but the charity takes by force of
the will as diminished by the codicil.33
It will be seen that the execution of a codicil within the restricted
period, making an identical or lesser bequest to charities than was provided in the will, is held to pass the bequest under the will. Although
no case is found directly in point, the inference is that an increase in the
bequest would totally revoke the prior bequest, and the entire gift to
charity would fail under the restriction of the statute. Here again it
could be contended that the intent of the testator in increasing the charitable gift was contingent upon the gift being effective. On policy and
the basic intent of the statute to prevent charitable gifts only during the
designated period before death, it seems the prior bequest not frowned
upon by the statute should be effective, but only to its content, and the
increase in the codicil or later will should be voidable.
A more troublesome problem may arise where the will or codicil
executed within the controlled period revokes one specific bequest or
27.
Pa. 331,
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Hartman's Estate, 320 Pa. 321, 182 Atl. 234 (1936); Hoffner's Estate, 161
29 At. 33 (1894).
McCauley's Estate, 138 Cal. 432, 71 Pac. 512 (1903).
Bingaman's Estate, 281 Pa. 497, 127 At. 73 (1924).
McDoles' Estate, 215 Cal. 328, 10 P.2d 75 (1932).
Hartman's Estate, 320 Pa. 321, 182 Afl. 234 (1936).
See note 29 supra.
33. Morrow's Estate, 204 Pa. 484, 54 At. 342 (1903); Carl's Appeal, 106 Pa.

635 (1884).
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devise to charity and substitutes another of no greater value. The cases
above cited infer that there would be a complete revocation of the prior
devise or bequest, with the new gift falling under the restriction of the
statute. It may be argued that if the property of the earlier specific
devise or bequest is in existence there would be no conflict with the intent
of the statute as the execution of the gift of certain value was evidenced
at a time not frowned on by the statute. The later devise or bequest simply
changed the form of property from which the same or a lesser value will
accrue to the charity. If, on the other hand, the earlier specific devise
or bequest has ceased to exist, a later provision for different property of
the same or lesser valuc would be a new gift to which the restriction should
apply.
A further problem arises where a residuary bequest to charities, made
before the restricted time, is increased by transactions either testamentary
or inter vivos, but within the restricted period. It is obvious that a
residuary bequest may be indirectly, but greatly, implemented by testamentary changes in the will or change in the form of assets during life.
Where half the estate is bequeathed to a son and the residue to charities
a revocation of the bequest to the son shifts the entire estate to the
charity. Should this be permitted during the restricted period? It has
been held that a change in investment within the restricted period which
in effect increases the charitable devise or bequest is not contrary to the
statute. 3 4 It seems the same result should follow where the testamentary
gift to charity is indirectly increased by changes in the will, even if within
the restricted time. The intent to give has been evidenced by an execution at a time distance from death considered proper. However, if the
machinations of those to be benefited could be shown to have influenced
the revocation of other bequests within the restrictive period so that the
charities residuary interest would be increased, such should be held within
the purport of the statute and the increase avoided. Under proof of
this nature, it seems the increase is actually executed within the restricted
period. If it could be shown that the primary intent of the testator was
not to revoke a bequest but to benefit the charity, it is a testamentary
disposition at that time and so voidable under the statute.
CONCLUSION

Although Florida was the last to enact a statute limiting the right to
devise or bequeath to religious and charitable objects, many of our jurisdictions have had similar restrictions for many years. Very few problems
arising under this Act have been presented to the Florida courts to date,
but it is probable that many will be presented in the future. Although
there is a wealth of judicial decisions on these problems in other states,
most precedent to be found indicates a tendentious pattern in which the
intent of the legislation is permitted to be circumvented with impunity.
34. Manners v. Philadelphia Library Co., 93 Pa. 165 (1880).
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A court which looks to the basic intent of the legislation (to prevent the
"near death" devise or bequest to charities to the unwarranted detriment
of the natural objects of the testator's care and affection) will refuse to
sanction these devious practices which utterly nullify this intent.3 5

35.

A few nominable matters:

An antenuptial agreemelt waiving all claims to the

property of the other was held a waiver of the right under the statute to avoid the
charitable bequest. Beers' Will, 85 App. Div. 132, 83 N.Y. Supp. 67 (3d Dep't 1903).
A cancellation of a note, due from a charity, by a will executed within the restricted
period was held to be voidable under the statute. Wiley v. Church, 45 Pa. D. & C.
296 (C.P. 1942). Members of the class have no right to challenge a testamentary
Vatson Estate, 177 Misc. 308, 30
gift to charity until the death of the donor.
N.Y.S.2d 577 (Surr. Ct. 1941). A spouse divorced from bed and board was held a
spouse within the Act and may avoid the charitable gift. Moseley's Will, 138 Misc.
847, 247 N.Y. Supp. 520 (Sur. Ct. 1931). A wife separated from her husband at
his death was also held entitled to raise the statutory restriction. Watkins' Estate,
118 Misc. 645, 194 N.Y. Supp. 342 (Surr. Ct. 1922). The Florida statute provides,
"If a testator dies leaving issue of his body". Would this include an illegitimate child?
See Hastings v. Rathbone, 194 Iowa 177, 188 N.W. 960 (1922). Where the charity
is unsuccessful in litigating these matters, it is not entitled to an allowance for expenses
and fees. Kirkbride v. Ilickok, 155 Ohio St. 165, 98 N.E.2d 4 (1951).

